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ADDRESS
A PRACTICAL APPROACH
TO THE USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY*
IRVING YOUNGER**
I. INTRODUCTION
I NEED HARDLY URGE THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPERT WITNESSES. With ever
increasing frequency, trials in the state and federal courts, civil and
criminal, tort and otherwise, turn upon expert witnesses. It is fair to say
that it is impossible for a lawyer to proceed with any confidence these
days unless that lawyer has a very good grasp of the considerable body
of law that has been developed with respect to expert witnesses. By a
considerable body of law, I refer specifically to segments of three
separate structures of doctrine: that part of the law of evidence with
respect to expert witnesses; the very important part of the law of pro-
fessional responsibility with respect to expert witnesses; and finally, a
very considerable part of the law of trial advocacy for trial technique.
It is my purpose here to weave together those three bodies of law so
as to provide you with a recapitulation of what the trial lawyer needs to
know when coping with the problem of expert witnesses.
I will raise the questions that a lawyer is likely to put to himself when
preparing a case involving expert witnesses, followed by an explanation
of how to deal with the expert witness in court. After raising particular
issues, I will sketch out the answer that you will find, and since we need
to look at some particular jurisdiction, I will pay attention to the federal
jurisdiction and the twenty or so states that have enacted the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Then, by way of contrast, I will refer to some New
York cases, simply because first, I know them best; second, New York
has not enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence; and third, New York is, I
suppose, the major jurisdiction on the other side of the road from the
Federal Rules of Evidence. New York tends to take a different view
from the federal view on many of these topics, and an examination of
the New York approach will provide an educational contrast to the
Federal Rules.
* This Address was delivered as the Nineteenth Cleveland-Marshall Fund
Visiting Scholar Lecture, at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
** Member, Williams & Connolly, Washington, D.C.; A.B., Harvard College;
LL.B., New York University School of Law.
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II. THE NEED FOR EXPERTS: THE PRE-TRIAL PERIOD
The first question is this: How do you identify or recognize an issue in
connection with which it will be proper to call an expert to the stand? I
suppose it never occurred to me that the question was there to consider
because, at least in my experience as a judge, in just about every case it
was beyond argument that it was proper to call an expert.
Take, for example, a "spleen-out" case where the main issue is the
amount of damages. The plaintiff's attorney will call an expert who will
testify that the spleen plays a vital, though as yet unidentified, role in
the body's immunilogical system. The expert will testify that without a
spleen this little boy has a life expectancy of a great big question mark,
and the case is worth at least half a million dollars. The defendant's at-
torney will call an expert with equal credentials to testify that the
spleen is left over from the days when we were fishes; it is a vestigial
organ like the appendix. It is of no significance whatsoever. The little
boy is just as good now as he was before he was run over; he is probably
better now as a matter of fact-maybe he ought to pay us.
Now, on an issue like that, obviously, expert witnesses are necessary
because the jury is totally incapable of resolving the question of
damages, which turns upon some assessment of the importance of the
spleen.
But take a different kind of case. Suppose you have a two-lane
highway, and in the middle of the night, two cars approach each other
on the highway travelling in opposite directions. Each car is driven by a
lone driver, and there are no bystanders. Suddenly, there is a head-on
collision. When the smoke clears, one car is over here, and the other is
over there. There are skid marks and debris on the highway and two
dead drivers. One estate sues the other estate. Now remember, there
are no passengers, no survivors and no bystanders. With respect to
liability, the decisive question is: On which side of the road did the collis-
sion occur? Once you decide on which side of the road the collision occur-
red, you know which driver had gone on the wrong side of the road and
you know who's in the right and who's in the wrong. I have given you
the facts of a case that came up in the United States District Court in
North Dakota in 1954.1
The estate that was on the plaintiff's side of the table called an expert
in accident reconstruction. Nobody would argue his credentials. The ex-
pert undertook to tell the jury that based upon his analysis of the skid
marks, the debris, where the cars ended up, etc., the collision occurred
in the northbound lane, which means, of course, that the driver who was
heading south had gone over on the wrong side of the road. Immediate-
ly, defense counsel leaped to his feet and protested, "objection, not a
' Ern v. Consolidated Freightways, 120 F. Supp. 289 (D.N.D. 1954).
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proper subject for expert testimony." "Objection overruled," said the
federal judge, "the expert may testify.12
I have given you the facts of that federal case, but simultaneously I
have given you the facts of a New York State case.' The accident
reconstruction expert was called. The objection was made, "This is not a
proper subject for expert testimony," and the trial judge overruled the
objection. The trial judge's overruling of the objection was reversed,
however, by the appellate court.4 This is not ancient history; this was
just a few years ago.
Now, if the federal judge decided that the expert may testify, and the
state judge decided that the expert may not testify on the very same
issue, the keen legal thinkers will recognize that probably two different
rules are at work. The federal judge, who made his decision back in
1954, was, of course, not working under the Federal Rules of Evidence.'
He was working against the background of a fair number of federal deci-
sions articulating the rule which was later codified in Federal Rule 702,
and which is followed in those states which enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence. It is a relaxed kind of rule which is not very demanding. It
opens the door quite wide to the receipt of expert testimony. The
federal rule might be stated as follows: "If the expert's testimony will
help the jury, it's admissible." In that highway collision case, obviously
it is going to help the jury to have the expert explain to them how he
figures out the force vectors and the like.
The state rule, the so-called New York rule, is more demanding. It is a
stringent rule which closes the door considerably to the receipt of ex-
pert testimony. Under the New York rule, the expert may not testify
merely because his opinion will help the jury, but only when his opinion
is necessary to the jury. That is a very different test from the federal
rule. The argument on the side of the lawyer who wants to keep the ex-
pert off the stand will be that perhaps it will be helpful to the jury to
have the expert give his opinion, but it is not necessary or essential. A
lay jury can manage to figure this out for themselves.
The ramifications of the difference between the federal rule and the
New York rule can be illustrated with two cases:
First case: It is my habit, whenever I talk about this case to groups of
lawyers, judges or lay people, to ask them to be the judge. I am going to
2 Id. These statements are characterizations of the events which transpired
at trial and are not direct quotations. This style will appear throughout this Ad-
dress.
' Stafford v. Mussers Potato Chips, Inc., 39 A.D.2d 831, 333 N.Y.S.2d 139
(1972).
4Id.
' The Federal Rules of Evidence did not become effective until 1975. FED. R.
EVID. 1103.
6 See FED. R. EVID. 702.
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give you the facts of a real case. I am going to give you everything you
need to know to make the decision. You are a federal judge, so the stan-
dard is that the expert may testify if it will help the jury. You have
been presiding for some weeks over a serious and highly publicized
criminal case. You are on your mettle on all criminal cases. This case is
extremely special due to its wide notoriety.
The prosecution's principal witness has testified in essence that the
defendant is guilty. He knows this to be so due to his own knowledge,
because he saw the defendant do what was alleged in the indictment.
This prosecution witness has been cross-examined for days and he has
not budged one bit from his testimony.
The defendant has taken the stand and has insisted that he did not do
it, and that the prosecution witness is lying. The defendant has been
cross-examined extensively and he has not budged one bit from his
testimony.
There is corroborating evidence on both sides but it is about equal in
weight and balances out. What the jury ultimately has to do is assess
the credibility of the prosecution witness and the defendant. If they
believe the former, the verdict is guilty. If they believe the latter, the
verdict is not guilty.
You are now at rebuttal. You are resting comfortably in the robing
room at about quarter to ten in the morning, ready to go onto the bench
at ten o'clock, having your cup of coffee, your cigar, your morning brandy
or whatever it is you need to wake you when there is a knock on the
door. Your heart skips a beat. Who walks in but counsel on both sides
and the court reporter. The defense counselor makes the following ap-
plication:
"Your Honor, of course, understands that this case boils down to a
matter of the jury assessing the credibility of those two witnesses. In
that connection, your Honor, we have an expert outside who we propose
to put on the stand this morning. We are raising with you the question
whether you will overrule us if we put that expert on the stand. The ex-
pert is a psychiatrist, but this is no ordinary psychiatrist. This expert is
the immediate past president of the American Psychiatric Association
and is a Professor of Psychiatry at the Cornell Medical School. He has
just been appointed Professor of Medicine at the Harvard Medical
School and Chief of Psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital. He
has studied medicine at Johns Hopkins and psychiatry in Vienna and
Zurich. He is unquestionably the pre-eminent American psychiatrist.
This man has never clinically examined the prosecution witness, but he
has observed him on the stand. He knows the facts of the witness' life.
The witness is a professional writer. The psychiatrist has read virtually
every word this witness has ever published. He is willing to take the
stand and state, as his professional opinion, that the prosecution witness
is suffering from a personality disorder, characterized by a tendency to
make false accusations and tell lies. "Your Honor, I see that you're
[Vol. 31:1
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laughing. With all deference," says defense counsel, "I remind your
Honor that it's not your job to assess the credibility of the witness. It is
your job simply to rule upon my application. May I call the witness to
the stand?"
Government counsel, of course, says, "This is the first time in the
history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that such a thing has ever been
suggested."
What is your rule? May the witness testify? May the witness not
testify? Now, don't call for the law clerk. There is nothing to look up in
the library. All that you need to know is that the test, in a federal court,
is whether the expert will help the jury. This is probably the twenty-
fifth time I have put this question to groups of people, both the profes-
sionally sophisticated and otherwise, and the outcome is always the
same: A very large majority says, "I will not allow the witness to
testify." I think it is because all of us tend to respond to the basis of our
own reaction to the psychiatrist. We think that it's a joke and so we
won't let him testify, but that is not our job. Defense counsel had a valid
point. Our job is simply to apply the federal rule, which is a very relax-
ed one, with respect to the propriety of the expert testifying.
That is a real case, and it is as far as any judge has gone, to my
knowledge, in applying the federal rule. The psychiatrist was named
Carl Binger. The judge was named Henry Goddard. The witness about
whom the psychiatrist was going to testify was named Whitaker
Chambers. And the case, of course, is United States v. Hiss.7
The judge ruled quite properly on the basis of federal law that the
psychiatrist could testify.' If ever you have to argue for the propriety of
calling an expert, the case is far beyond anything you are likely to en-
counter.
Dr. Binger did testify, and his cross-examination was one of the
bloodiest scenes ever played out in an American courtroom. To this day,
I am positive that Alger Hiss rues the judge's favorable decision. It
would have been much better for Alger Hiss if the judge had said, "I
will not allow this man to testify," because of the boomerang effect. The
prosecution so cut up Dr. Binger that it could not help but have an effect
on how the jury assessed the rest of the case. This, of course, was the
second trial, the one in which the jury found Alger Hiss guilty.'
Now, I said that I would talk about two cases. That was my federal
case. Let me give you a fairly recent New York case to show you how
the New York rule really has a cutting edge. Assume that you are in a
jurisdiction not bound by the federal rule, and that if you research the
88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 201 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 948 (1951).
Id.
See United States v. Hiss, 107 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd, 201 F.2d
372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953).
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issue you will discover that it has never been litigated in your state.
The issue has been litigated in New York, and the New York rule has
been followed in decisions in other states. But for the most part, the
matter has never come up because lawyers have not realized that it is
there to be raised. If you are arguing on the top of the rostrum, an open
question in this jurisdiction, let me show you how much progress you
can make with it.
The case is Kulak v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co." Mrs. Kulak is
the victim of an automobile accident. She sues her tort-feasor and her
tort-feasor, of course, has automobile insurance. These are not the exact
numbers but this is essentially what happens. A day or so before the
jury is to be picked to try that case, plaintiffs counsel goes to defense
counsel who really is the insurance company's lawyer, and says: "Look,
John, liability in this case is absolutely clear, and short of a miracle, you
can't win on liability." "Agreed," says the defense counsel. Plaintiff's
counsel continues, "And the specials are thus and so, and the pain and
suffering obvious. Look at the deformed arm and all the rest of it. It
seems to me that the jury verdict here is going to be in the range of a
quarter of a million dollars. You've got a one hundred thousand dollar
policy. Pay me ninety thousand dollars, take back ten thousand dollars
to the claims adjuster, and the game is over." Defense counsel says,
"No. Let's go to trial."
They go to trial. Was the plaintiff's assessment of liability correct?
Absolutely, as the jury resolves the case against the defendant. Was the
plaintiff's view of damages correct? Absolutely, the verdict was for one
quarter of a million dollars.
What does defense counsel do? He says, "Win some, lose some." He
pays out one hundred thousand dollars, puts the policy on the table, and
walks away, leaving the plaintiff one hundred fifty thousand dollars
short. The defendant has no assets, except for the insurance policy,
which has been placed on the table. Does that mean the plaintiff can do
nothing to collect the additional one hundred fifty thousand dollars? Of
course not, because the defendant does have an additional asset: He has
his own claim against his insurance company for unreasonable refusal to
settle and the claim is assignable.
The defendant assigns to the plaintiff the defendant's claim against
his own insurance company, takes a general release, and then goes
home. The plaintiff brings a second lawsuit, not against his tort-feasor
but against his tort-feasor's insurance company, seeking to collect the
additional one hundred fifty thousand dollars on the theory that it is the
appropriate damages given the insurance company's unreasonable
failure to settle.
What is the substantive rule? No lawyer or insurance company has a
crystal ball. There is no legal obligation to predict accurately what the
40 N.Y.2d 140, 351 N.E.2d 735, 386 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1976).
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outcome of the case will be, but there is a legal obligation to act
reasonably. So the question is: Did the insurance company act
reasonably when it turned down the plaintiff's proposal of the ninety
thousand dollar settlement? That is what the jury in the second trial
must decide.
In that second trial, the plaintiff calls two experts. The first expert
states, "I am experienced in this field of work." Everybody agrees that
he is experienced. There is no question about his credentials or his ex-
pertise. The expert continues, "And in this field of work, this is how you
assess the likely size of the verdict." The first expert tells the jury in
that second trial about the formula for predicting the amount of the jury
verdict in that type of case.
Then, the second expert takes the stand and says to the jury, "Work-
ing with the formula the first expert gave us, and feeding in the
numbers from the first trial, what the specials were and what the lost
earnings were and so on, you come out with the following answer." In
short, he indicates that what the defense counsel did was not reasonable
because he should have expected a verdict in the range of a quarter of a
million dollars.
The highest court of New York reverses on the ground that while it
was proper for the first expert to testify, it was not proper for the sec-
ond expert to testify."
So you see what I meant a moment ago when I talked about being
able to make some progress here. You can, in some cases, keep out the
other side's expert, assuming that it has not been resolved in your
jurisdiction.
The reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals is as follows: The
man in the street, who is, after all, our juror, cannot possibly know what
these formulas are. For that reason, the first expert was properly allow-
ed to testify, because the rule is that the expert may testify if it is
necessary to the jury, and, obviously, this was necessary to the jury.
But once the jury had the formula of the first expert, it was a matter of
elementary school arithmetic to feed in the numbers and do whatever
calculations were necessary to come out with an answer. It is helpful to
have the second expert do the arithmetic for you on the blackboard, but
it is not essential. Since it is not essential, the second expert should not
have been allowed to testify. Hence, the verdict is reversed and we send
it back for a new trial. 12
The second issue is of interest, generally, to those lawyers concerned
about the ethical position of lawyers. I am amazed that lawyers, generally,
are unaware of developments in the last few years on this point. The
question is a very practical one, but it invokes professional responsibility
11 Id.
12 Id.
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and legal ethics in connection with expert witnesses: How do you secure
the appearance of the expert in court?
Of course, most of you practice in a setting where this is never a prob-
lem. The expert is, of course, paid. It is his time. He earns a living that
way, and he must be paid. The attorney makes the arrangements to pay
him and he comes to court. We speak within the family; there is nothing
shameful about it. Most of the time the expert is kind of a "house ex-
pert," someone whom we have used before. Many of you have a "stable"
of experts, ten or fifteen doctors, who are indeed doctors in the sense
that they have licenses to practice medicine, but practicing medicine is
just sort of a complimentary term for what they do. These are doctors
who prefer to be in court. They are very good at it; they enjoy it. They
all look like Spencer Tracy; they make an infallible impression upon the
jury and each side then produces somebody drawn from that group of
experts. In the normal situation, you just call up somebody, you work
things out financially, and the expert appears in court.
But suppose you can't work it out? Let us suppose, for example, that
you are a lawyer practicing for a public interest law firm. You need an
expert and you do not have the money to pay him. What can you do?
Well, if you are covert, the first thing that will occur to you is to talk to
the expert over the phone. The expert has just told you that he will be
glad to come to court to testify and his opinion is helpful to your side of
the case, but he has to be paid and his fee will be five hundred dollars.
As an ingenuous but realistic lawyer, you say: "Doctor, I'm afraid we
don't have the five hundred dollars."
The expert says, "Well, in that case, good luck to you, but I guess I'm
not going to be there in court."
You say, "Doctor, don't hang up. We don't have the five hundred
dollars but tell me, are you by any chance a gambling man?"
The doctor may well respond, "Well, now that you mention it, I like to
go to Las Vegas every weekend."
"Well, doctor, I make no promises, of course, but if we win this case,
there will be a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, and ten percent of
that pot of gold will be yours."
"Well," says the doctor, "that's a different story. It's a gamble, like
you say, and we may lose. The thing is that if we do win, I've got ten per-
cent of the pot of gold. You've got a deal."
Do you have a deal? Yes, I suppose you do have a deal. Is the lawyer
also in trouble? You bet your life he is in trouble! Disciplinary Rule
7-109(C) states that the retaining of an expert on a contingent basis is an
unprofessional act."3 It is not that you can argue it either way. You have
done something unethical when you retain an expert on a contingent
basis and you are going to be in trouble. The reason is this: If you per-
13 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(C) (1981).
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mit lawyers to retain experts on a contingent basis, that will encourage
litigation. That is really what it says. Isn't that absurd? We allow
lawyers to be retained on a contingent basis precisely because it will en-
courage litigation. That is the whole idea. If you are cynical, you say the
whole idea is to permit lawyers to earn a living. If you are not cynical,
you say that the idea is to permit poor people to come to court and get
their problems decided. Yet we say that an expert may not be retained
on a contingent basis because that would encourage litigation.
An argument can be made that the real point of Disciplinary Rule
7-109(C) is that it discriminates ambiguously between rich litigants and
poor litigants. Rich litigants can retain an expert. A poor litigant will
not be able to retain an expert because he does not have the money and
because he is actively forbidden to retain the expert on a contingent
basis. If you think this is a haywire argument, please note that it has
been raised once, and the United States District Judge before whom it
was raised agreed with the argument and declared Disciplinary Rule
7-109(C) unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.' He was
Judge Duling of the Eastern District of New York. Judge Duling,
however, was reversed on appeal, 15 so the only decision which has con-
sidered the constitutionality of Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C) held that it is
not unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.
Again, for lawyers, this is not an issue of merely theoretical, academic
or general interest. One of the reasons you have so much trouble getting
an expert if you are without resources is that an expert is in a different
position from an ordinary witness. That different position might be
phrased as follows: The ordinary or lay witness, for example, the
bystander who happens to see the two cars collide, has an obligation of
citizenship to come to court and give the judge and jury his perceptions.
That obligation is invoked or triggered merely by serving upon John Q.
Bystander a subpoena and tendering a ministerial witness fee of two
dollars and fifty cents, or whatever it is in your jurisdiction. If he does
not come, several things will evolve. If necessary, a policeman will go
out and bring him to court.
The common law, however, has said that an expert witness is in a
very different position. The expert witness has an opinion. The common
law traditionally regards the expert witness' opinion as his private
property. He may give it away, he may sell it, but it may not be compelled.
The perceptions of John Q. Bystander may be compelled, but the expert
witness' opinion may not be compelled. I heard in the very early days in
New York, and I daresay it is the same in every other jurisdiction, that
if you purport to serve a subpoena upon an expert to obtain his opinion
and tendered the expert the two dollar and fifty cent witness fee, he
" Person v. Association of Bar of City of New York, 414 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), rev'd, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
" 554 F.2d at 534.
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will tear it up, he will disregard it, and if you have the temerity to ask
the judge to send a policeman to go out and arrest him, you will be
laughed out of court.
For example, you are a young attorney, you do not know much about
how these things work but you have your first case, and lo and behold,
it is a spleen-out case with no issue on liability. The question is simply
the amount of damages. In particular, what is the significance of the
spleen? You go to the public library and you discover that on the faculty
of the New York University Medical School is a man who won the Nobel
Prize about fifteen years ago for work on the physiology of the spleen.
His view is that the spleen does play a vital role in the body's im-
munilogical system and without a spleen, your client has a significantly
diminished life expectancy.
So, you call him up and ask, "Will you come to court, doctor?" "No,"
he replies, and since you can't ethically propose a contingent contract,
you say to yourself, "I'll serve him with a subpoena, give him a subway
token and then he will have to come to court and tell me about the work
for which he won the Nobel Prize in medicine." Of course, he won't come
to court until you dare to ask the judge to hold him in contempt or have
him arrested. The judge will have none of it. But the traditional and
well-settled view of this situation is in the process of change. It is so re-
cent that I cannot tell you how far it will go, but I can tell you the
authority upon which I stand when I say that it is in the process of
change. It's a marvelous case and I cannot explain why it has not been
more widely noted in the literature. It is a decision that arises out of the
IBM antitrust case that has been on trial before a judge in the Southern
District of New York for six years. 6 I have not misspoken. The trial is in
its seventh year. The trial! Nonjury! Not pre-trial, not motions, not
discovery. Seven years of trial! And if you ask me what in heaven's
name are they trying for seven years, I must tell you that I do not know.
The lawyers don't know and the judge doesn't know and not even God
by this time knows. It is impossible to comprehend what in heaven's
name has been going on for seven years. But, there you are.
I daresay that all of you do not have more than a mere bowing ac-
quaintance with the way an antitrust case is tried these days. Take the
IBM antitrust case. It is a civil action. The government says, "Let's
break it up. They are too big. They have monopoly power." As to factual
issues, as we recognize factual issues, there is no dispute. How many
electric typewriters did IBM sell in 1977? Look at the records. Nobody
quarrels with it. How many computers did they sell? All of that is not in
controversy. What is in controversy -what they have been trying for
seven years-boils down to matters of opinion. Do they have monopoly
16 See Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976). Accord Carter-
Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973).
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power? Are they too big? That is what you try in an antitrust case. It
works this way, and it is no different from a major court case: The plain-
tiff-in this instance, the government-will call fifty percent of the
economics professors in the United States. Each and every one of them
will testify that IBM is a kind of "King Kong" in the business world. It
is an enormous enterprise whose power represents a threat to the sur-
vival of the republic. What you have to do is break it up instantly! When
it is the defendant's turn, they call the other fifty percent of the
economics professors, each and every one of whom testifies, "Not IBM,
it's kind of a 'Mom and Pop' store. Therefore, you should leave them
alone."
About the third or fourth year of trial, the government heard about
three men, and when they heard about these three men, the little hairs
on the backs of their necks stood up. These three men were not pro-
fessors in economics but did have graduate degrees in economics or
business administration. Do you know what they were? They were in-
vestment bankers. One was a senior partner in one of the major account-
ing firms. These were business people who, as a part of their own
business activities, had made a lengthy study of the computer industry
in order to better advise their own clients. Significantly, each of them
had come to the conclusion that it would inure to the economical health
of the computer industry to break up IBM. Now you see why the
government's hackles stood on end. Here are three men who are not
academic, who are probably registered Republicans, and who are on
record that IBM ought to be broken up. These are witnesses made by
heaven.
The government approaches these three men. They are not associated
in business. They are different people working for three different in-
vestment banking houses, but the conversation with each of them was
the same. The government goes to them and says, "Will you testify?"
"No."
"Why? Do you want to be paid? Name your price. It doesn't matter.
We just print the money. We'll print some more for you."
These three men say, "We know that is the way you do it, but that's
not the point. No matter what you pay us we're not going to court
because first, it's inconvenient; second, it's undignified; third, it's a
lawyer's kettle of fish; and fourth, we just don't want to be in the posi-
tion of helping the government in this case even though we are on
record that it would work to the economic well-being of the computer in-
dustry to break up IBM."
So the government says, "What do we do now?" They have a brain
session and cause a subpoena, an ordinary witness subpoena, to be served
upon each prospective witness.
Now, these fellows are not helpless. They're members of investment
banking firms, so each of them calls the Wall Street law firm that repre-
sents his employer and tells the Wall Street law firm, "Hey, I got this
1982]
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subpoena. What should I do with it? They tried to subpoena me as an ex-
pert."
Many of you have had dealings with Wall Street law firms or Wall
Street-type law firms, so you know the reaction of the Wall Street law
firm. The senior partner, upon being told what has happened, says over
the telephone, "That's a problem."
Before the sun has set and come up one more time, a task force has
been organized. The senior partner, two middle level partners, five
junior partners, seven associates, twelve paralegals and thirty secre-
taries work twenty-four hour shifts among them to prepare a motion to
quash the subpoena. After running up approximately $175,000 in time
charges, they've got the motion to quash the subpoena.
You've got the three motions all before Judge Edelstein and, to
everybody's amazement, Judge Edelstein denies the motions. He says,
"No. They're going to have to come testify." The federal practitioners in
the room know that there's a problem as to whether you can appeal such
a ruling. Maybe you can, mgybe you cannot, because appealability of
interlocutory orders is a currently unresolved issue in the federal
courts. So, to be on the safe side, they filed a notice of appeal and simul-
taneously moved in the Second Circuit for an extraordinary writ in the
nature of a mandamus. The style of the case is Kaufman v. Edelstein;7
Kaufman was one of the three men who made the motion for mandamus,
and Edelstein was the judge. The panel that settled that case was made
up of three judges as experienced and distinguished as any three judges
in the United States, Henry Friendly, Murray Gurfein and William
Mulligan. These are men of vast experience as practicing lawyers, as
well as judges, as good as judges ever get to be. They unanimously af-
firmed Judge Edelstein, not on procedural grounds, but on the merits of
the question.18
The following is a fair summary of the opinion written by Judge
Friendly. The old common law idea that an expert's opinion is his
private property, to give away, sell or withhold as he wished, must yield
to the reality of modern litigation. With ever increasing frequency, liti-
gation, these days, turns upon the testimony of experts. It follows, then,
that to say to an expert, "You can withhold your opinion at will," is as
much as to say to an expert, "You may obstruct justice whenever you
please to do so."
It is time to equate the status of the expert witness to the status of
the ordinary witness. If the ordinary witness has an obligation of citi-
zenship to give the jury his perceptions, then the expert witness has
some kind of obligation of citizenship to give his opinions to the judge or
jury. Therefore, we hold that these men's testimony is compellable. Of
17 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976).
18 Id.
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course, the client has to pay something more than the ministerial wit-
ness fee for the testimony. The circuit court handled that Very sen-
sibly-they said, "We're not going to talk about that at this time; we're
going to leave it to the witnesses and the government to work out. If
they can't work it out, then come back to us." I am informed, unoffic-
ially, that the amount of the witness fee was never the problem. It was
finally agreed what the compensation would be and the three men did
testify.
Now, reverting to my status as a law professor, let me try to predict
the future. I can't really predict the future, but I can point to the two
rules which may evolve, one of which will represent the trend of doc-
trinal development.
One rule: Kaufman v. Edelstein will become an important case
ultimately leading to a reformulated rule. An expert witness may be
compellable, subject only to the parties agreeing on the amount of com-
pensation, and if they cannot agree, the judge will decide upon
reasonable compensation. Putting that aside, you can get an expert to
court the same way you get an ordinary witness to court, by serving
him with a subpoena.
The other rule: We all know cases which fit this pattern. Twenty
years from now, Kaufman v. Edelstein will be nothing more than a
historical curiosity. It will be understood that Kaufman v. Edelstein is
not the precedent of general application. As courts like to put it, it must
be limited to its facts, which means Kaufman v. Edelstein is
authoritative only the next time the government sues IBM, the case is
being tried by Judge Edelstein and the three men, one of whom is nam-
ed Kaufman, decline to come and testify as experts. Otherwise, it
doesn't mean anything to anybody.
My hunch is that the former is more likely to become the prevailing
approach. Lest I be accused of having misled any court, in Kaufman v.
Edelstein, the experts had already done the work preliminary to arriv-
ing at an opinion, so all that was required of them was to come to court
and repeat the opinion to the jury.
What do you do when you've got an expert whose expertise makes it
possible for him to do the work that will lead to an opinion, but he has
not yet done the work? Is there any way of compelling him to do the
work so as to get him to court with his opinion? On that, Kaufman v.
Edelstein is absolutely silent and all we can do is guess. That is enough
discussion, perhaps more than enough, for the question of getting the
expert to come to court.
III. USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN COURT
We are now in court. We have an issue on which it will be proper for
the expert witness to testify and we have arranged for the expert to be
in court. Now what happens? Of course, what happens is the direct ex-
amination of the expert, followed by the cross-examination of the expert
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and concluded by final argument to the jury about the credibility of the
expert. Those major matters represent the three other questions I
would like to address.
A. Qualifying the Expert Witness
The next question is: What is there to say about the direct examina-
tion of an expert? Were this a group of lawyers who are not in court
every day, I would pronounce something like this: If you went to law
school as long ago as I went to law school, almost everything we learned
in evidence about the direct examination of an expert is no longer the
law. There has been a revolution in the development of the law of
evidence with respect to matters that come up on the direct examina-
tion of an expert, at least in the federal courts. Likewise, in those states
which follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial attorney must be up-
to-date in his knowledge of the rules of evidence because he cannot func-
tion on the direct examination of an expert without having those rules
right in his hand. So, let me review them with you, talk about the Federal
Rules of Evidence and give you a couple of cases to illustrate them.
You begin the direct examination of an expert, any kind of an expert,
any kind of case, with a qualifying of the expert. You qualify the expert
in the first part of the direct examination. To qualify the expert means
to ask the questions designed to show that the expert possesses exper-
tise, that is, an expert by reason of education, experience, independent
work, or whatever it may be.
I don't think I ever had a lawyer in front of me that didn't know you
began the direct examination of an expert by qualifying him. But almost
no lawyer seemed to take sufficient advantage of the opportunity for ad-
vocacy by qualifying the expert. All attorneys seemed to go through it
mechanically, pro forma, as if they were doing it by rote.
This is a grave mistake. It is an advocate's mistake as well as a
technical mistake. It is based upon a partial view of what you're doing
when you qualify the expert. These lawyers knew that when you qualify
an expert, in a manner of speaking, you are talking to the judge. And
you're saying to the judge something like, "Your Honor, doesn't this
witness possess expertise beyond that of the man or woman in the
street?," hence making it proper for this witness to give his opinion
under the expert witness exception to the nonopinion rule. It tells the
judge, "Let him give his opinion."
It is almost impossible not to persuade the judge to let the expert
give his opinion. It takes very little to qualify as an expert in that sense.
You need not be a Nobel Prize winner. If the issue is an issue of
medicine, all you need do is show that this person has a license to prac-
tice medicine. In many jurisdictions a license is not necessary-that the-
witness is a graduate of a medical school will suffice. That he has not yet
practiced, that he's yet to win a Nobel Prize in medicine, goes to the
weight of his opinions, not to the competence of it, and not to the judge.
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For example, if you need an expert witness to testify against General
Motors or Ford on how the braking system of an automobile operates,
you do not need a Ph.D. in automotive mechanics from M.I.T. A
mechanic from the gas station down the road that has been doing this
kind of work for thirty years will be allowed to give his opinion.
Whether the jury buys the opinion is a different story. So, it's almost
impossible to fail to persuade the judge to allow the witness to give his
opinion which is perhaps why the lawyers don't work very hard at it.
They sleepwalk their way through.
But that's only a part of what's going on. It is just one of the two
things that you are doing. When you qualify an expert, you are talking
to the judge in the manner that I described. But simultaneously, you are
talking to the jury and you are saying to the jury something like, "Ladies
and gentlemen, listen to this expert's credentials. Have you ever heard
anything so impressive in your life?"
By the end of the case you will be arguing to the jury that it ought to
accept your expert's opinion. I will return to this later, but never forget
that the one thing the jury cannot become is a physician or an economist
or an engineer. They cannot master the substance of whatever the
discipline is that's involved. They have got to assess credibility by using
other things that are accessible to them. And one of the things that is
accessible is qualifications, or weighing your expert's qualifications
against those of the other expert. So you've got to work at it. You don't
sleepwalk your way through what you've prepared as carefully as
you've prepared everything else. There's no one right way to do it, ob-
viously. Everything depends upon the expert, the feel of the courtroom,
who's the judge, who's the opponent, what's going on in the jury room,
etc. But you do your best to develop it and build it and end at a high
point, assuming you're lucky enough to get Dr. Elko, that's my Nobel
Prize winner, into court. Do something with it, begin with junior high
school where he began, when he came to the United States and how he
had to learn English before he could go to work as a biochemist and all
those years of long nights in the laboratory, working, working, crank-
ing, cranking, publishing, publishing, and finally at the end, a doctor as a
result of all this work.
"Have you received any professional recognition from your colleagues
in the field of medicine?"
"Oh, well-."
"Come on, Doctor."
"Well, since you insist, I guess so. I have received some sort of-a
couple of years ago, I won the Nobel Prize."
Of course that's the point at which to end your qualifying, because
you've come to the climax. Sometimes it's nice to wrap it up in a pink
ribbon. It draws the line to show that that first part of the direct is over
and it serves as adequate purpose as well. You won't do it with every
case, but sometimes you might consider it.
Turning to the judge, after Dr. Elko has announced that he won the
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Nobel Prize a few years ago, you say to the judge something like, "Your
Honor, I ask the court to declare Dr. Elko an expert in the field of
physiology."
Now, you see, all you''re doing is saying to the judge, "Your Honor,
with respect to that first thing that's going on, whether the expert can
give his opinion, have I done it, Judge? Have I done it?" And, of course
you've done it, so the judge says, "Yes." How does the jury hear it? The
jury hears it as the judge certifying that your expert is an expert. The
judge's authority begins to be associated with your expert's authority.
And since the judge is the ultimate figure in the courtroom, it's a very
nice phenomenon to have working for you.
What's happening on the other side? Well, this is elementary. On the
other side, of course, you don't want the jury to hear about those
credentials, assuming that the credentials are of any substance. So the
instant they call the expert, you know it's Dr. Elko, you know he won
the Nobel Prize, you know that the judge is going to let him testify.
What can you do to keep that from the jury? Leap to your feet the in-
stant Dr. Elko's name is called, and what do you say? You begin with,
"Judge, let's save time. There's no need to spend a half hour reviewing
Dr. Elko's credentials. I am perfectly prepared here and now to
stipulate that Dr. Elko is an expert and entitled to give his opinion
under the expert witness exception to the nonopinion rule."
I deliberately would say it in jargon so that the jury doesn't know
what I'm stipulating. What the judge should do, I guess, is look over at
the proponent. Now, suppose you are the proponent. What do you say?
You say, "Oh, no, no, no." The reason you say this is because of the two-
fold function of this process. The opponent is only stipulating as to the
first function, ie., the expert's credentials, not to his credibility. The
proponent would ask his adversary, "Are you prepared to stipulate the
credibility of Dr. Elko?"
"Of course not."
"In .hat case, your Honor," say you, as the proponent, "I decline the
concession and I assert a right to put Dr. Elko's credentials before the
jury."
Now, I wonder whether any of you have run into this problem: The
judge says, "Wait a minute. I run my court and when there's a chance to
save time, I save time. I refuse to let you develop the credentials. You
must accept the concession and proceed directly to the substantive part
of the direct." This problem has been addressed by a federal court.
It is a reversible error for the trial judge to insist that the proponent
accept the concession, and for the trial judge to refuse to allow the pro-
ponent to develop the credentials. 9 Unstated in the decision, but ob-
viously implicit, is the situation where you've got a concession and you
decline it, the judge can put a reasonable limit on the time you spend on
" Murphy v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 547 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1977).
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the credentials. He can say, "All right, Counsellor, go ahead and do it,
but, please, two minutes, not two days." Whatever is reasonable, it's im-
possible to say.
1. The Ultimate Issue Rule
In qualifying the expert, and whatever kind it is, ultimately the ex-
pert is going to give you his opinion. What if the opinion deals with an
ultimate issue? You have a problem. Well, remember what I said. If you
went to law school as long ago at least as I went to law school, the law is
very different from what you learned. I seem to recall a day in the
course of Evidence when the teacher stood up front, and said, "Ladies
and gentlemen, the cases are legion in all jurisdictions, that even though
everything else is proper for the receipt of the expert's opinion, if the
opinion deals with an ultimate issue, the opinion is not admissible. You
can't have an opinion on an ultimate issue." And then some bright young
person's hand went up and the professor said, "Yes, what do you have to
say?"
The student said, "Professor, you can't have an opinion on an ultimate
issue, but what's an ultimate issue?"
The professor said, much as Potter Stewart once said, "I can't define
it, but I recognize it when I see it." You know it when it comes along.
You can talk around it, but you can't really define it. And the only way I
can characterize it is this: An ultimate issue is a factual question which,
once answered, decides the case. It is the ball game. And if you look at it
that way, you will recognize what it is. In the head-on collision case,
federal and state, with which we started, the question was on which side
of the road did the collision occur, and that is the ultimate issue in those
circumstances. Once you answer that question, the case is over, at least
with respect to liability. There is nothing else to talk about.
The professor was right. You can't define it, but you can recognize it
when you see it. The cases were legion in all jurisdictions holding that
an opinion on an ultimate issue was inadmissible. Those cases are just
about universally recorded as outmoded. I cannot say that in every
jurisdiction you will find a case overruling those old cases, but if you
raise the question, I am sure that will be the court's decision. The old
cases are rejected as anachronisms; the better view, the contemporary
view, is that an opinion on an ultimate issue is admissible, as long as
everything else is appropriate for admissibility, of course."0 This is the
unwritten law of every state, with only a few exceptions.
In a very recent federal case coming up from the Fifth Circuit" the
defendant was charged with maintaining a premises for the purpose of
taking bets on horses without having paid the necessary tax to the
FED. R. EVID. 704.
" United States v. Masson, 582 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1973).
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treasury. A bookie is supposed to have a tax stamp. Now, in effect, he's
running a bookie joint without the necessary tax. The defendant con-
cedes that the apartment in question was his apartment. He concedes
that he did not pay the tax. The only issue in the case is whether he was
maintaining that apartment as a bookie joint. That was the only issue.
And on that issue, the prosecution's evidence consists of a few reels of
tape, recordings of what was being said over the defendant's telephone
lines for a period of some weeks. Those recordings were made pursuant
to lawful wiretaps. The only difficulty is that when you listen to these
recordings, they are audible in the physical sense, but they are absolute
gibberish with respect to really comprehending them for a reason which
I do not know.
First, I must tell you that the only vice to which I am immune is
gambling. It makes no sense at all why it is pleasurable to so many peo-
ple; hence, I know nothing about the technology of gambling. I gather
from the opinion, however, that it is just unthinkable for a bettor to call
a horse parlor and say, "Two dollars on Whirlaway in the fourth at
Aqueduct." There's a whole language that is used, not even the dialect
of English; it is a separate language, totally opaque to the outsider.
That's what you hear on these tapes, so that when you play them to the
jury, it might as well be Oedipus Rex in the original Attic Greek. The
ordinary listener does not know what it means.
The government offers to call to the stand an expert, a policeman, a
revenue agent, who's spent his life running around the bookie joints.
Now, he has no personal knowledge of this case. He will testify solely
and purely as an expert to this effect: "I listened to these tapes, and I
tell you that what you hear is the language of placing bets on horses."
Once that opinion comes in, the case is over-obviously, the defendant
loses. If you keep the expert testimony out, the defendant wins.
Defense counsel, remembering those old cases about which his law
school teacher in Evidence told him, leaps up and he says, "I object. It's
an ultimate issue." And the judge says, "You're right. It's an ultimate
issue, but your objection is overruled. An opinion on an ultimate issue is
admissible.""2
Take a different example. This is a decision of the highest court of
New York. The claim is defective design, that is, that the product was
designed in such a way as to be unsafe and that the state of the art at
the time the product was designed permitted the design of a safer pro-
duct. The state of the art is the ultimate issue.
An expert, whose credentials are not being questioned, testified that
the product was not as safely designed as the state of the art would
allow.13 Twenty-five years ago, it would have been startling to suggest
FED. R. EVID. 704.
2 Lancaster Side & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 427
N.Y.S.2d 1009 (1980).
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that such an issue was admissible. You hear cries of "ultimate issue,"
"intruding upon the province of the jury," etc., etc. "No, no, no not at
all," says the New York Court of Appeals. Remember, we're not work-
ing with the Federal Rules of Evidence, but with common law evidence.
That's perfectly proper although it is an ultimate issue. The jury is
pre-projected, of course, but it's something the jury may hear and may
take into account. That's what the case is all about. You must
distinguish always the ultimate issue, which is proper, from the expert
who says to the jury, "The plaintiff should win this case, or the.defend-
ant should win this case." That is never proper. No expert may ever tell
the jury what the verdict should be,2" because the verdict involves an
application of the law that the judges should explain to the jury, to the
facts that have been developed, including the expert's opinion on an
ultimate issue. But applying the law is exclusively the responsibility of
the jury; no expert is competent to testify to that.
To illustrate this, take a real case, which was not reported apparently
because the Supreme Court of Arkansas directed that it not be
reported. A lawyer, aware of my interest in the matter, sent me a copy
of the relevant pages of the transcript. Arkansas has either enacted or
followed the federal rules on this point. This is a criminal case, and the
prosecutor that is involved called a deputy sheriff and had him testify
that he, the deputy sheriff, is an expert criminal investigator, that he in-
vestigated the allegations of this indictment, and that they are true.
Whel they revive defense counsel, in a small weak voice, he says, "I ob-
ject, your Honor." The judge says, "Oh, no. Your objection is overruled.
That's an ultimate issue, to be sure, but it's proper for an expert to
testify to an ultimate issue." There is a conviction, an appeal and then it
is reversed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas. This, however, is not an
ultimate issue. This is an expert telling the jury what the verdict should
be. No expert can testify to that. You've got to distinguish between the
the ultimate issue and what the verdict must be.
2. Certainty of the Expert Opinion
Well, so much for the opinion upon an ultimate issue. This brings us
to what is philosophically and legally perhaps the most interesting of
the questions that I will discuss: How certain must the expert be? This
is a matter which the courts have handled in a way that I find very
satisfactory, in that it is consistent with common sense and what
philosophers and scientists have told us to be the nature of the universe
in which we live. Let me use the physician as the expert witness around
whom I will weave what I have to say on this topic. Everything I say
about the physician is transferable to the economist, the engineer or
other expert witnesses.
24 H. LIEBENSON, YOU, THE EXPERT WITNESS 44-45 (1962).
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Medicine, like every other discipline, is less than an exact science.
Medicine may rest upon some sciences which are exact. I suppose
anatomy is exact, and much of biochemistry is exact, but when you put
it all together, as any doctor will tell you in an honest or drunken mo-
ment, what you have is medicine, not quite a science but more nearly an
art. It is highly probable that when you do certain things, other things
will happen, but it is by no means 100% certain.
Suppose that you have a physician on the witness stand and he has an
opinion whatever it may be. Putting aside the terminology in which you
couch the question, if you ask him, "Are you 100% certain?" his candid
answer will be, "No, I am not 100% certain. I cannot be 100% certain of
anything in medicine."
What does the law require as the requisite degree of certainty? Simply,
let's put it on a numerical scale. Now, obviously, the expert has to have
some degree of conviction in his opinion, so it's got to be more than zero.
Actual certainty is the certainty that we really only have when it's a
definition. For example, two plus two equals four, because we define
four as what you get when you put two and two together. That is 100%
certain. We understand that in the world of litigation, you will never
have an expert who can be 100% certain. We are on the continuum from
zero to 100%. Where must the degree of conviction rest if the court is to
allow its opinion to come in?
Let's begin with a hypothesis. Perhaps the expert has to be fifty per-
cent certain and the verbal equivalent of fifty percent certainly would
be, I suppose, maybe yes, maybe no, and it's about equally weighted on
either side. Just about every court that has been called upon to decide
this question has held properly, in my "opinion," that the requisite
degree of conviction must exceed fifty percent. It's got to be more than
a possibility. Reason? Anything is possible. Absolutely anything is
possible. Any philosopher will tell you that. It is possible that the
Almighty created the rivers, this planet and all of us five seconds ago as
we came in from coffee, creating us with our memories already in our
minds. It's possible, not likely, but possible. Since anything is possible,
to permit an expert to testify on the basis of fifty percent conviction
does not make any molds, it does not move things along. It can be one
way, or it can be the other way, we just don't know.
So, at this point, we understand it has got to be more than fifty per-
cent. But of necessity, it will be less than 100%, which obviously points
us to what we've got to do. I suppose that in numbers, seventy-five per-
cent would be, in words, probable-more than possible, but less than
certain. It must be probable so that whatever the words in which he
couches it, the expert may be in a position to say, "The degree of the
conviction I have, my opinion, is that it's probable."
It is for that reason, I suppose, that most practicing lawyers who in-
terrogate experts, especially with respect to physicians, have a certain
locution. It's a mere formula in which they ask the expert for his opin-
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ion, and I have nothing against formulas. They signal to the judge that
the lawyer is aware of the rule of law that requires the expert to be
seventy-five percent certain, and you use the formula so that the judge
recognizes what is going on. I think the formulas are pretty much the
same in all states, but they may vary in detail. In New York, in both the
state and the federal court, the formula that you will hear day in and
day out when a physician is on the stand, goes something like this: "Now
Doctor, do you have an opinion which you can give us with a fair degree
of medical certainty as to blah, blah, blah?"
A fair degree of medical certainty is the formula. But what is a "fair"
degree? It's a weasel word. It can mean almost whatever you want it to
mean. Then what's a "fair degree of certainty"? I thought certainty was
100%. So, a fair degree of 100/o is not certain.
Another difficult problem is distinguishing a "medical certainty" from
some other kind of certainty. You can criticize it when you take it apart
as a magician would, but I really don't mean to criticize it. It serves its
purpose, even though you are using words that are devoid of meaning
when you say to an expert physician, "Doctor, do you have an opinion
that you can give us with a fair degree of medical certainty?"
It's as if you are saying to the judge, "Hi, Judge. See, see, I know.
He's going to give us his opinion in accordance with the rule that re-
quires it to be about seventy-five percent on the scale." There's no
reason not to do it that way. In New York, however, we had a very im-
portant lawsuit in which the intermediate appellate court published a
splendid opinion.25 Those judges are very good, perhaps superior to our
Court of Appeals judges. This case was on an interesting point of prac-
tice: Is the formula required? Assume, for the sake of argument, that on
the degree of conviction, the expert meets the minimum seventy-five
percent. He really thinks that it's more probable than not probable. But
for one reason or another, the formula has not been used. Is the formula
required? It's rather an amusing situation in a very important case. Let
me take a moment to tell you about it.
Lesson number one is that when you prepare an expert, be sure that
you prepare him on that little formula that we lawyers take for granted.
Remember, the expert, the physician, unless he's been around court-
rooms a lot, has no idea that the formula signifies something very impor-
tant to the judge. It's a way of saying to the judge that the expert's
degree of conviction meets the legal standard. Be sure that your expert
is aware of that; otherwise, the layman might believe that "probable"
means about the same as "possible." One does not really distinguish
very carefully between the two. This case is Ward v. Kovaks, and it in-
volved a young woman, unmarried, in her early twenties, who's very
attractive. She was earning a fairly good salary as an executive assis-
Ward v. Kovaks, 55 A.D.2d 391, 390 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1977).
SId.
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tant downtown, and she decided to take her two-week vacation at Fire
Island. Many of you have been there; all of you, I daresay, know it by
reputation. It's a swinger's paradise, off the south shore of Long Island.
She spent her two weeks on the beach at Fire Island swinging, and in
the course of a swinging session, she cut her finger. It was more than
you would put a bandage on and forget about, but it was not severe
enough to require a trip to the hospital. She went to a local physician
and the local physician did whatever he does and sent her home.
She woke up that night and the finger had swollen enormously, and
the hand was throbbing and the pain was murderous. She realized that
she was in trouble and managed to get to the mainland of Long Island to
a hospital where she was diagnosed as having a fulminating streptococ-
cus infection. That means, in layman's terms, that the streptococci had
just gotten out of control, and, as some of you know, this situation is life-
endangering.
The hospital used heroic measures and they controlled the infection
and ultimately cured her. However, she was left with a claw-hand which
is permanently disabled and terribly disfiguring. She can't work at her
job any more, and she claimed that her condition was due to the doctor's
malpractice.
Although there are many issues to this case, the issue that concerns
me is the response by the doctor's insurance carrier; for ease, I will just
refer to the doctor. The doctor's response is that he did not commit
malpractice, and the reason that he gave for this fulminating infection
was that the woman's blood stream was full of LSD. She wasn't just
"swinging" during her vacation. She was chock full of LSD, and the
defense calls as an expert witness a nice young man who spends all of
his waking hours in a laboratory. He's a laboratory physician; he doesn't
treat patients. He's a scientist, and he's been working on the effects of
LSD on the body's system. He has not been properly prepared. He takes
the stand and says, "In my opinion, though we're working on this, when
you have LSD in the blood stream in the quantity that the plaintiff did,
your ability to resist bacterial invasion is substantially reduced. That's
the reason for this fulminating infection: her own ingestion of LSD."
The cross-examiner now stands up to cross-examine and senses that
the doctor has not been prepared on the significance to lawyers of those
magic words. The cross-examination goes this way. "Really," he says,
"Doctor, you're not sure, are you? No, of course you can't be sure."
"It's possible."
"Of course, it's possible." And he sits down, figuring as soon as he
leaves the stand he's going to strike.
On redirect: "When it's possible, it's probable?"
"That's right."
Recross. "When you say it's possible, it's probable."
"That's right." Back and forth they go, each one feeding the magic
word to the doctor and the doctor totally unaware there is a difference.
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To a layman in this respect, there's no difference between possible and
probable, and they go back and forth.
The opinion is very well done. I can tell you that the requisite degree
of conviction is probability, or seventy-five percent if you want to use
numbers, but no particular formula is required. It's handy to have the
formula. It saves a lot of trouble. But if you don't have the formula,
what the court must do is look at the expert's testimony as a whole and
in the context of the case and decide whether it was the fair intention of
the expert to say it's probable. The court concluded that the expert really
meant to say it's probable. The court concluded that the expert really
meant probable in this case; hence, the motion to strike the expert's
testimony was properly denied.
B. Permissible Bases of Expert Opinion
The next point is a favorite of mine. I regard this particular portion of
the federal rules as the single most radical thing in the entire codifica-
tion, and the wrongest thing in the codification. I think this is crazy, in-
defensible, but there it is, and people who are senior and better than I
obviously think that it's a good idea. In any event, we've got to live with
it. Moreover, not only is this the law in a federal rule jurisdiction, but it
is increasingly the law in nonfederal rule jurisdictions. In my own state
of New York, the highest court has adopted this provision to the federal
rules by way of judicial fiat, not by the official adoption of the rules.
The next point is the issue of the permissible bases of an expert's opin-
ion. I'm going to put it in question form. Upon what may an expert rely? I
think the clearest way to show you what's been happening in the last
few years is to begin with the common law and then proceed to the
federal rules. I will tell you about the New York decision, more or less
following the federal rules, and then point out some of the dangers here.
When I say "common law," I mean the background rule which used to be
followed in all jurisdictions and, of course, would still be followed in a
number of jurisdictions today. The background rule is that an expert's
opinion had to rest upon data in the case.27 They can say the same thing
in different words. Everything upon which the expert relies must be
supported by evidence. You want to be very pompous about it? There
must be enough proof from which a reasonable juror could find the fact
to be so as to everything upon which the expert relies. And to say it one
last time in algebra, because it's easier that way, if the expert says,
"Here's my opinion, and I rest it upon A, B and C," A, B and C must be
in evidence. There's got to be proof in the record from which a
reasonable juror could conclude that A, B and C are the packets. If he
says, "Here's my opinion, and I rest upon A, B, C, D, E and F," and the
first three are in evidence, and the latter three are not in evidence, an
objection to the opinion will be sustained.
2 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 703[011 (1981).
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Just briefly, the analytics of it go this way: Since ultimately the opin-
ion goes to the jury because it will help them or be necessary to them,
depending upon which rule you follow, the opinion must rest exclusively
upon the evidence in the case, because it's the evidence in the case that
the jury is trying to understand. If the opinion of the expert goes
beyond the evidence in the case, the opinion is immaterial. It has
nothing to do with the jury's work, and so we don't let the jury hear it.
I'll show you how applying the common law rule would work with the
simplified facts of a real case, the kind you work with day in and day
out.
Expert physician: issue, fibrosis. What ailed an elderly lady? What
was wrong with her when she came to the doctor? The doctor's
testimony, simplified, goes this way: "I am a general practitioner, a
family doctor. I specialize in the skin and its contents, as a general prac-
titioner once said. And I think that was a lovely way to put it. But, since
I try to know about everything, I can't know too much about any one
thing. In any event, the lady comes to me and there's obviously
something wrong with her. My job is to figure out what. I conducted a
physical examination. One of the things I did was feel the back of her
neck and the neck muscles were in spasms." There's fact A. That's proof
that the muscles were in spasms.
"Next, I looked down her throat and I saw red patches." There's fact
B. Spastic, spasm muscles, red patches. He saw it, he felt it. We've got A
and B.
"I found nothing else remarkable. And on the basis of A and B, I could
not arrive at a diagnosis. So what I did was send her out to three
specialists, a neurologist for a nerve workup, a hematologist for blood
chemistry work and a roentgenologist, for certain x-rays. They did their
work and sent me their reports. After I read their reports, I was able to
arrive at a diagnosis."
Now, the proponent is going to ask what his diagnosis is. You see
analytically where we are. This diagnosis rests upon five pieces of data:
A, spastic muscles, in evidence; B, red patches, in evidence; C, what the
neurologist found; D, what the hematologist found; and E, what the
roentgenologist found, not in evidence. Those men have not testified
and their reports are plainly hearsay.
"Objection," says the opponent.
Says the judge, "Where are those three guys?"
The response from the plaintiffs counsel is, "Oh, you know, I don't
know judge. I've even-." His honor says, "Forget about the rule
against hearsay. Maybe you have their reports in your file and you can
show the reports to the other lawyer."
"Judge, I lost the file." So, His Honor, in his well-nigh limitless
wisdom, says, "The objection is sustained. The expert cannot give his
opinion because three-fifths of what the expert rests the opinion on is
not in evidence. It's absolutely inexcusable."
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That case, if one is interested, is called Sirico v. Cotto. 8 The opinion
was written and published in New York. Now, I do want to urge you to
read it because I wrote it myself. Apart from my mother and me,
nobody has ever read it. That was 1971. It was eleven years ago, and
that was the law of New York, the common law rule. The expert's opi-
nion could come in only if each item of data was supported by evidence
in the record.
The question remains, should the common law rule limiting the opi-
nion to matters supported by the record be preserved? There had
developed a considerable body of scholarly criticism of that rule, and the
scholarly criticism went this way: The rule is very expensive, because it
means that the proponent, to go back to my case, who wants to prove
that simple general practitioner's diagnosis, is going to have to call not
only the general practitioner, but the three specialists, with all of the
time and effort and expenses and all of that. Wouldn't it be better to
have a rule of evidence, that is, common rule, which accepts the rule
that governs the practice of the people in the discipline represented by
the witness on the stand? Should not the rule of evidence be congruent
with the physician's practice? When physicians practice medicine, it's
taken for granted that the general practitioner receives and relies upon
the reports of the specialists. So, should not the rule of evidence be
enacted to make it possible for the general practitioner to stand to
testify in the manner parallel to the way in which he practices medicine
in his office down the street?
The view had carried the day and culminated in Federal Rule of
Evidence 704.' I think I can give the rule to you for all relevant pur-
poses in the exact words. The opinion may go beyond the evidence so
long as it is reasonable to do so. Reasonable is the word and that is the
only limit or standard that we have.
The word "reasonable" is understood to be a statement of two factors.
First, is it customary in the expert's field to rely on this information?
And then, assuming it is customary, the judge has a check or balance
function. It may be customary, but the judge has to decide that the
"custom" is a reasonable one.
So, to go back to my issue, "Doctor, did you send the patient out to
the neurologist, the hematologist, a roentgenologist?"
"Yes."
We assume they're not going to testify.
"Doctor, after reading their reports and taking into account the two
findings you made upon clinical examination, were you able to arrive at
a diagnosis?"
"Yes."
28 324 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971).
29 FED. R. EVID. 704.
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Now, Doctor, is it customary in the field of medicine for the general
practitioner or the family doctor to rely upon the reports he receives
from specialists?"
"Yes."
You wouldn't do it this way in practice, but you do make the point
clear.
"And Judge, I submit that it's reasonable for the general practitioner
to follow that custom."
And I think the judge would say, "Yes, I think it is reasonable. Doc-
tor, what's your opinion?"
And here it comes, even though three-fifths of the material upon
which the opinions rest are not in evidence.
I said I'd tell you about a New York case which adopted that rule.3 1 It
is a criminal case, which is even more surprising. The defense is insanity.
It's now rebuttal. The prosecution calls a psychiatrist whose opinion is
that the defendant was sane at the time in question. Let me cut through
to the essential fact.
"Dr. Psychiatrist, upon what do you rely?"
He says, "I rely on A in evidence, B in evidence and C in evidence." But
also, although it's only one out of four items, the doctor says this was
important: "I also rely upon a statement I was given by the defendant's
girlfriend about their intimate relation." This statement is not in
evidence and is unknown to the jury. Although the girlfriend had
testified about a different phase of the case, she had not been asked
anything about the statement or about her personal relations with the
defendant.
The statement itself cannot go into evidence. Nevertheless, the New
York Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York, held that the
psychiatrist's opinion was admissible.' It is a dual holding for reasoning
having to do with the law of New York. The opinion is by the Chief
Judge, Charles Brytel, who is a great technician and knows how to do
these things. One of the aspects of the holding is that since the rule to
be followed in the second sentence of Federal Rule of Evidence 703"2
makes a lot of sense, it is adopted for New York. Granted, the
girlfriend's statement was not in evidence and was unknown to the jury,
but it is customary for psychiatrists to rely upon such statements about
people's personal affairs. The court saw nothing unreasonable about it;
therefore, the expert's opinion was admissible.
Now do you realize what this means? I can do little more than raise
questions because most of the questions are unanswered. The expert
' People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 323 N.E.2d 169, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1974).
31 Id. at 456, 323 N.E.2d at 171, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
FED. R. EVID. 703 provides in pertinent part that "if of a type reasonably
relied on by experts in the particular field in forming opinion or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence." Id
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opinion gets in, even though some or all of the data upon which the opin-
ion rests is unknown to the jury. How does the jury assess the opinion?
How do you attack the opinion? If the opinion gets in, does that open the
door for you to put in the underlying data, assuming that will help you?
I don't know. Is this a kind of new exception to the rule against hear-
say? Maybe. Can you argue that, in addition to opening the door to the
adversary, it opens it to the proponent? For example, "Judge, the rule
says I can put the opinion in. I want the jury to be able to assess the
credibility of the opinion, so why shouldn't I be allowed simply to help
them assess the credibility of the expert? Why shouldn't I be allowed to
put in the underlying data, be it hearsay, double hearsay, whatever it
may be?"
How far do you go with it? The following does not concern a reported
decision, but it is a real transcript sent to me by a lawyer who knew of
my interest in it. The case is a private antitrust suit in the federal court
brought under the federal rules. The plaintiff claimed that the defend-
ants monopolized the business of selling golfing equipment at retail. The
plaintiffs called an economist to testify that, in his opinion, there was a
monopoly in this line of commerce. The following came out of cross ex-
amination: "Mr. Economist, on what do you rely?"
"Well, I rely principally upon what I was told by somebody I met at a
cocktail party. I don't know his name," he said, "But I met him at the
cocktail party, and he said he's a retailer in the field and he told me
about the way things were. And that is what I relied upon."
"Well," the judge said, "That's over the line. That's neither customary
nor reasonable. I won't allow it."
Where do you draw the line? And perhaps more to the point, I just
told you that came out on cross-examination. Perhaps the most
troublesome aspect of Rule 703 opening the door to opinions resting
upon things not in evidence is what you deal with when you put Rule
703 together with Rule 705.
How do you physically bring out the expert's opinion? You qualify
them, to recapitulate. The opinion may deal with an ultimate issue, but
that's not going to be a problem. The expert is prepared to tell you that,
though we can't be 100% certain, it's at least seventy-five percent cer-
tain. We will pass for the moment the question of the bases of the ex-
pert's opinion.
Now, how do you bring it out? The problem first presented itself to
common law lawyers and common law judges, two centuries ago, when
the universally applied rule was that the opinion had to rest entirely
upon data supported by evidence. And so, the mechanical problem was
how do you elicit the opinion to make it possible for the judge and your
opponent to be certain that everything is supported by evidence in the
record? The resolution of that mechanical problem was, as we all know,
the hypothetical question. Except in very rare cases in which an expert
had personal knowledge of the underlying facts, we use the hypothetical
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question. For example, consider again Dr. Elko, our Nobel Prize winner
in spleens. He also, by the way, has a Ph.D. in chemistry. He is not a
medical doctor, so he could not possibly have done the surgery or
anything of that sort. "Dr. Elko, I'm going to ask you to assume certain
things. A little boy, eight years old, as a result of being hit by a car at a
school crossing is taken to the hospital." The adversary says, "Is there
evidence of that?"
"Yes."
Check. Judge does the same.
"At the hospital, he is diagnosed as having a ruptured spleen. The
surgeon removes the spleen in an uneventful splenectomy."
"Is there evidence?" "Yes," answers the proponent. Check.
"The little boy makes an eventful recovery except for a small scar of
no cosmetic significance. He is now fine, of course, he has no spleen."
"Is there evidence of that?" Check.
"Doctor, assuming those to be the facts, do you have an opinion which
you can give us with a reasonable degree of physiological certainty as to
the significance to that little boy of the fact that he no longer has a
spleen?"
"Yes."
"What is that opinion?"
And you're in the business. When you do away with the rule requiring
everything to be supported by evidence pro tanto, you do away with the
need for the hypothetical question. The hypothetical question has itself
been the subject of a good deal of scholarly criticism based on the notion
that lawyers have come to abuse the hypothetical question.
No lawyer worth his salt on either side of the table would dream of
asking Dr. Elko that hypothetical in the manner in which I just did. The
way I just did it is perfectly okay for the textbook illustration and okay
for the record, but it does nothing for the jury. Every lawyer of any ex-
perience knows that the hypothetical question is a wonderful way of
summing up to the jury without really summing up, so that he gets to
do it again in two days when it's really summing up time. It's a pre-
sumption, and it's usually the plaintiff's bar that's doing it this way.
Very effective personal injury lawyers would spend at least half an hour
asking that hypothetical question.
There's no requirement that everything in the hypothetical be rele-
vant to the opinion so long as, under the old rule, everything is sup-
ported by evidence. "Doctor, I'm going to ask you to assume certain
facts. When Johnny got up that morning, Doctor, the sun was out, birds
were chirping in the trees. Doctor, he came down to the kitchen at 7:35;
you know what he said to his mother, Doctor? 'What's for breakfast."'
And on and on. And by the time the hypothetical is over, the jury is
weeping and we're weeping too. You know what it is, but naturally, the
jurors don't know what it is.
The scholar says, "This is not the purpose the hypothetical was in-
tended to serve. We don't want jurors weeping in the jury box. It makes
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a terrible mess. No, no, no." Practicing lawyers, however, like
hypotheticals for the reason I have suggested.
Now, here's where we were a little while ago-Rule 705 telling you
that you don't need to use the hypothetical and put it together with
Rule 703, that the expert's opinion need not rest exclusively upon
material in evidence-and see what the proposal can do. Assume it's a
private treble damage action. You've qualified the expert as an
economist. You know the rest of the direct examination is one question
long.
"Doctor, professor, do you have an opinion as to whether the defend-
ant is a monopolist?"
"Yes."
"What is that opinion?"
"He's a monopolist."
"Oh." Sit down.
The rules tell you, the opponent, that if you wish to explore the
underlying data, you may do so on cross-examination. With all
deference, whoever wrote that provision never cross-examined
anybody, because anybody who's ever cross-examined in a real trial
knows that cross-examining a witness is approximately like crossing a
mine field. You will not be alive when you get to the other side unless
you have a map to begin with, and even then you may not make it.
So, here we are. The guy says he's a monopolist and the proponent
sits down. We're the opponent. Now, what do you do? You say, "What
do you base your opinion on? Is it based on what somebody told you at a
cocktail party?"
Maybe the judge won't rule the way that other judge did, that it's
unreasonable. What if you say, "What do you base that on?"
"What somebody told me at a cocktail party."
"Oh, Judge. I move to strike that."
And the judge maybe says, "You asked for it, counsellor. You've got
it."
Now what do you do? Maybe tactically the best thing to do if the op-
ponent does that on his direct examination is, "No questions." There's
no questions on cross and then shrug it off to the jury: "What was it
about? The man was on the stand for ten seconds. He didn't tell you
anything. It has no weight. It has no substance."
Well, maybe that's not tactically the shrewd thing to do. Then what
do you do? I don't know. I think it's an insolvable problem in trial tactics
or technique and it's a problem created for us by the insufficiently
perceptive way in which Article 7 of the Federal Rules of Evidence deal-
ing with expert testimony has been drafted.
One last example to this. I saw swine flu cases being tried all around
the country." Those cases are now being decided and they're going
I "Guillian-Barre Syndrome.
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various ways, depending upon the evidence. In an opinion that I had a
chance to study carefully and that for some unaccountable reason is not
reported,u Judge Finesilver decided the case for the government essen-
tially on the issue of causation. There is a paragraph in the opinion,
however, which discusses the way to analyze the evidential problems
presented when the plaintiff calls his expert to the stand. Plaintiff's ex-
pert was a physician and the opinion ultimately was going to be that
what happened to this plaintiff was caused by the injection of the anti-
toxin. Ultimately, the judge rejected that.
The basis of the opinion was a line of clinical tests as to the relation-
ship between the anti-toxin and the development of the syndrome.
Under the rules applicable to the admissibility of scientific tests, those
tests were not admissible. The judge said so. However, the doctor says,
"I relied on those tests in coming up with my opinion."
It is customary for doctors to rely upon tests which are not yet fully
clinically accepted. Even though the tests themselves are not admissi-
ble, it is permissible for the expert to give an opinion based upon these
tests which I won't let myself hear and I wouldn't let the jury hear.
There's a strange kind of internal inconsistency there. Imagine if you
had a jury. Have you ever seen a juror raise his hand? I've seen it
several times. And the juror says, "Judge, the doctor says it's his opinion
that the swine flu anti-toxin caused the syndrome and he bases it on cer-
tain tests. We haven't heard about the tests. Can we hear about them?"
"No."
"Why?"
"They're not generally accepted among scientists."
So, the juror says, "So why can we hear the expert when we can't
hear what he relies on? What's going on here? If the law says that, sir,
then the law's an ass, sir."
C. Cross-Examination of the Expert Witness
First and foremost, under the general heading of cross-examination of
an expert, always remind yourself as you plan the cross-examination of
the opposing side's expert that an expert is, to begin with, a witness
like any other: Any mode of impeachment that would be proper of an or-
dinary witness is proper, even though this fellow is an expert. Now,
most of the time, there is nothing that you can do. There is no ammuni-
tion for it, but one time out of a hundred, there will be something that
you can do. And the way to remember it is to use that as sort of the first
item on your checklist. Forget that he's an expert. He's just John Q.
Bystander.
' See In re Swine Flu Immunization Products Liability Litig., Lima v. United
States, 508 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1981).
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What can I do? For example, I sat in what we think was the busiest
metropolitan trial court in the world and it was before no-fault and com-
parative negligence. Very rarely was there a genuine issue on liability.
You know as well as I that the fight is over damages, whether it's a
thousand dollar case or a half million dollar case. And on that, I incor-
porate by reference what I said earlier. We all know the plaintiff's bar
has its doctors and the defendant's bar has its doctors. Lawyers see
these doctors day in and day out, and get to know the routine. They all
testify exactly the same. Plaintiff's doctor says, "Permanently disabled,
basket case, we'd bury him except we get a jiggle every time we give it
a shake, you know."
On the defense side, "He's as good as he ever was; he's a malingerer."
The jury figures, "Ah."
The jury sees these guys only once. We see them day in and day out
and we forget that it looks a little different if you're seeing them only
once.
I have presided over cases in which a certain doctor had testified for
the plaintiff at least twenty times, always the same way. "The plaintiff
is destroyed by this accident. We would bury him but we can't."
I will call the doctor "Smith," because that was his real name. I must
say that in the eyes of the jurors, seeing Dr. Smith for just one time, he
was awfully impressive. He looked like Spencer Tracy, he knew how to
talk to them. He sat on that witness stand and when the key question
came, you know, "Doctor, we have an opinion, explain it." He turned to
the jurors and he crossed his legs and he looked at them with his clear
blue eyes and there was nothing that he might ask them to do that they
would refuse him. He just emanated that kind of fatherly part.
Twenty times I had him in my court and twenty times defense
counsel was absolutely feckless on cross-examining him. The cross-
examination accomplished nothing-it was worse than if you had just
left him alone. In the twenty-first case, I'm sitting there minding my
own business. Dr. Smith tells his usual story. Defense counsel gets up
like a tiger out of the thicket, and his first question is, "Dr. Smith, have
you ever been convicted of a crime?"
And I start getting ready, "Counsellor, you can't ask that question
without a good-faith basis." But before I can open my mouth, Dr. Smith,
who has been told you've got to be candid about everything, replies,
"Yes, I have been."
And the lawyer continues, "Was that in federal court or state court?"
"Federal court."
"Was it a felony or a misdemeanor?"
"It was a felony."
"What felony was it?"
"Income tax evasion."
"Were you found guilty after trial, or did you plead guilty?"
"I plead guilty."
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"What was your sentence?"
"A year in jail."
"Did you serve it?"
"Yes."
Can you imagine, twenty defense lawyers let that guy present himself
to the jury as if he were Spencer Tracy. Only the twenty-first
remembered that an expert is a witness like any other. You've got the
ammunition, you can impeach him as you can an ordinary witness. And
the guy is a felon, a federal felon. Shame on those twenty lawyers who
didn't make it their business to find out so they could tell the jury about
it! That's my first item on cross-examination. Never forget to look
whether there is anything you can use as to any witness.
Second, there are, in addition to the usual or traditional or orthodox
methods of impeachment, two special methods of impeachment available
only with respect to experts. They are available in the federal court,
they are available in all states that follow federal practice, and there
may be one or two states that permit only one of these two. But, by and
large, all states permit both. For an example of these methods, consider
Ruth v. Fenchel," which is little more than an essay on these two modes
of impeachment and all of their ramifications. It was decided by the
New Jersey Supreme Court, and the author of the opinion is WilliamJ.
Brennan, Jr., now a Supreme Court Justice.
The two methods of impeachment, when trial lawyers get together to
talk shop, are usually collectively described as "impeachment out of
treatise." By "treatise" we mean any printed source: a textbook, a
treatise, an article in a journal or whatever it may be. To demonstrate
this, I find that it makes sense to take an absolutely absurd example
which makes it very clear, and we don't have to worry about following
the facts.
Assume that the witness is a physician who has testified on direct
examination that, in his opinion, the appendix is on the left side of the
body. Now, we all know that this is wrong, the appendix is on the right
side of the body. Now, let's see how we can impeach him out of treatise.
Suppose this guy wrote a textbook on anatomy and on page 100 it says,
"The appendix is on the right side of the body." Can we use it? Cer-
tainly. Is there anything unusual about it? No. This witness has just said
something different from what he said in his textbook. So it's impeach-
ment of the witness by a prior inconsistent statement.
If you have an ordinary witness, may you impeach him with somebody
else's inconsistent statement? A on the stand says one thing, Z says
something else. Can you tag A with Z's contradictory statement? No,
you just can't-it's not permitted by the rules with respect to im-
peaching an ordinary witness. But when the witness is not ordinary,
21 N.J. 171, 121 A.2d 373 (1956).
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when the witness is expert, there are circumstances in which you can
impeach him with what somebody else said, so long as it's in the
treatise, textbook, article or whatever it may be, and so long as you do
the necessary thing first. There are two ways of doing it. First, you
must ask the preliminary question, not necessarily in these words, as
long as the essence of it is the same: "Doctor, in the course of getting
ready to testify in this case, did you consult this book, Gray's Anatomy,"
or whatever book we are using. It doesn't have to be those words, but
it's got to add up to that. "Did you consult, did you read, did you refer
to, did you glance at or look at it?" If he says, "No," you're dead in the
water. Go to something else. If he says, "Yes," that's all that is required
to use the argument. You have laid the foundation. And the best way to
proceed at that point is to turn to the judge, simply for reasons of eti-
quette, and say, "Your Honor, may I read to the jury from page 100?"
The judge presumably says, "Yes," if he knows what's going on. You
now turn to the jury and you simply say, "Reading from page 100 of
Gray's Anatomy, quote, 'the appendix is on the right side of the body,'
close quote." Slam the book shut, sneer at the witness. This is not likely
to happen, because the witness is usually not dumb. Axiom number one
of all trial lawyers is assume the other lawyer is smarter than you, so
you've got to make it up in hard work.
The other lawyer knows what you know. I don't mean that people lie,
but the witness will not say yes to that question. He will not tell you
that he consulted the book. That is why, as Brennan points out in Ruth
v. Fenche",36 there was later developed the second way of doing it, a res-
ponse to the reality of what happened in trial. The witness is not going
to concede that he consulted the book, so you've got another way of do-
ing it. "Doc, do you see this book, Gray's Anatomy?"
"Yes."
Again, it doesn't have to be those words, but it has got to add up to,
"Is this book authoritative?" That's lawyer talk. I wouldn't ask it that
way in front of the jury. But-
"Is this the bible? Is this the standard reference? Is this what all doc-
tors look at when they have got to look up a question of anatomy?"
If he says "No," you're dead in the water. If he says, "Yes," you've got
him. Now, proceed the same way.
"Your Honor, can I read to the jury from page 100?"
"Sure."
Turn to the jury and read from page 100.
The Federal Rules make it express that when you use either of these
modes of impeachment and you do get the necessary affirmative
answers that you can read to the jury, and that's what you do. You do
not visibly put the book into evidence. You simply read the passage that
36 Id.
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you're interested in to the jury and the jury has it read back by the
stenographer, if need be, but they do not get the book physically to look
at for themselves in the jury room or otherwise.
Second, you've got him in your ball park, playing your ball game by
your rules. Shame on you if you can't score a few points. But you're not
going to reduce him to tears, of course, but you can score a few points.
Not, "Doctor, is this book authoritative?" No, of course not. You know
who the other side's expert is going to be. It is in the rules. Just ask for
his name in an interrogatory. If you get it, go to the medical directory.
Find out where he went to medical school. If you have access to a big ci-
ty library or medical school library, you probably will be able to get the
catalog for that medical school for the very year he took the course. And
it's the custom, as you know, for medical school catalogs to print the
name of the textbook that's being used. So you go back and you get the
very volume that he used.
"Doctor, did you go to medical school? When you went to this medical
school, did you by any chance take a course in anatomy? Did you pass it?
Did they have a book in that course? Is this the book?"
"That's the book."
"Oh, this is the book used for that course?"
Obviously, he's got to say, "Yes, it's authoritative."
Suppose, however, that you use one or the other of these modes of im-
peachment and you read to the jury from page 100 of Gray's Anatomy,
"the appendix is on the right side of the body." Let me tell you what
this does to the evidentiary posture of the case. At common law, these
modes of impeachment are available. Suppose you use them. You use
them successfully. You put before the jury the statement in the book
about the appendix being on the right side of the body. Do you have a
hearsay problem? At common law, no, because the statement in the
book is, of course, an out-of-court statement, but an out-of-court state-
nient is hearsay only if offered to prove the truth of what it asserts.
And the common law analysis is that the statement from the book does
not come in to prove the truth of what it asserts. It does not come in to
prove that the appendix is on the right side of the body. It comes in sole-
ly as bearing upon the credibility of the expert you are impeaching.
That's why you have no hearsay problem whatsoever. But you also have
no evidence that the appendix is on the right side of the body. You have
got the witness' testimony on direct that it is on the left side of the
body. The statement from the book suggests that he doesn't know what
he's talking about, but there is no affirmative evidence that it is on the
right side of the body. And if you have the burden either of going for-
ward or of proof with respect to that issue, you will, by common law, be
required to call your own expert to testify that the appendix is on the
right side of the body.
That is the common law analysis. Under the Federal Rules, all kinds
of marvelous things are available to you, and the place to look is Federal
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Rule 803(18)"7 or your state rule equivalent if your state has enacted the
Federal Rules. There are no fewer than four possibilities under 803(18).
Not all of them are universally noted by lawyers, and potentially each of
them is very useful.
Possibility number one: You can impeach the other side's expert in
the manner that we have described. Under 803(18), when you read from
page 100 that the appendix is on the right side of the body, you are do-
ing two things simultaneously. First, what you are doing in common law
is impeaching the expert. The out-of-court statement comes in as affect-
ing the expert's credibility. But simultaneously, it comes in to prove
the truth of what it asserts, so that at the end of the cross-examination,
you have not only discredited the other side's expert, but you have also
put affirmative evidence before the jury that the appendix is on the
right side of the body.
Now, number two. You call your own expert and, under 803(18), you
can use a treatise affirmatively. You say to your own expert, "Doctor, is
this book authoritative?"
"Yes."
You may now read to the jury whatever is relevant and it comes in to
prove the truth of what it asserts, so that you have got your expert's
live opinion supported by the material in the book.
The third situation is rare, but one can imagine a case in which it
would happen. You are not cross-examining the other side's expert and
you do not have an expert yourself, but the book is sufficiently well-
known that the judge will take judicial notice that the book is
authoritative. As to Gray's Anatomy, the most recent edition, I suppose
that is so. It's hard to think of a judge who would not be aware that this
is the standard. If the judge will take judicial notice that it is
authoritative, you may read to the jury what you want and it comes in
to prove the truth of what it asserts. It may lack a certain sex appeal,
but this method takes the place of a living witness.
The fourth situation is implicit in the rule. I have not seen the re-
ported case for which it was done but, obviously, there is no doubt it can
be done under the rule. For example, you would like to be able to call
Dr. Elko, that Nobel Prize winner, but for one reason or another, you
can't. He's sick, or maybe he's dead. You can't get him to come to court.
The Work for which he won the Nobel Prize is an article, and one para-
graph to that article states the matter with which you are concerned as
clearly as it can be stated. If only you could get that to the jury to prove
the truth of what it asserts, you would be in business. The other side is
not calling an expert, so you can't do the first method. You are not call-
ing an expert so you can't do the second one. The article is not so well-
known that the judge would take judicial notice of its authoritative
nature.
31 FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
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You call an expert, not a physiologist, not a physician, but a medical
librarian whose testimony, not in these words, of course, adds up to, "I
don't even know what a spleen is. I'm not a doctor. I don't know
anything about it. But I do know about the literature of medicine and I
do know that this is the thing you look at when you want to learn about
the physiology of the spleen." Your expert testifies, not to the underly-
ing fact, but to the authoritativeness of the treatise. You may now read
to the jury whatever you want from the treatise and it comes in to
prove the truth of what it asserts. You realize that you can get some sex
appeal out of that. If the librarian is prepared properly, the librarian
will say, "This is what you look at, because the author of it won the
Nobel Prize for this article." The jury now starts to pay attention. Your
reading from the article is almost as good as having the Nobel Prize
winner on the stand-all under 803(18).
To conclude on this subject, you must also prepare your own expert
to meet this kind of cross-examination. Remember, you are working on
the assumption that the other lawyer knows as much as you do, the
other lawyer has worked through the literature and knows what in the
literature contradicts your expert's opinion. And he's going to know
how to use either or both of these modes of impeachment. I will make
three suggestions.
First, unless he is an expert who knows his way around courts and is
familiar with how lawyers operate, you have got to do whatever you
have to do to persuade the expert that you understand, that in every
discipline, there will be contradictions in the literature. Nothing is
unanimous. Everybody disagrees on everything of any importance. In
my experience, experts who are not familiar with how lawyers operate
are reluctant to tell you that. They are afraid that you are going to cry
or lose heart in the case or send them home or something of that sort.
Make sure they understand. You are quite grown-up and you are aware
that there is no unanimity. Make sure that your expert tells you what in
the literature differs from or contradicts his opinion. Then you work
with him on getting ready to meet it.
Suggest to your expert that when the other lawyer pulls out a book
or the learned journal, your witness should very politely say, "Just a
minute, Counsel. May I see the book?" Now, you see, this is danger-free.
Nothing can go wrong. And, so long as he asks politely, the lawyer will
automatically hand him the book or the judge will say, "Give him the
book."
Your expert takes a second or two to look at the book. Now, what is
he looking for? The book is not a counterfeit; that's only in the comic
books. But as you all know as well or better than I, there is no discipline
whose practitioners appear on the witness stand, as expert witnesses,
that is not exploded. Medicine itself may not be exploded, but the
sciences upon which medicine rests or what physics were in the early
years of this century have changed drastically. Literally every day ma-
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jor discoveries are being made. All you have to do is read the science
reports in the papers with all the extraordinary things that are being
done. Physics appears to be about to go into a revolution: engineering,
mathematics, everything is changing. The consequence? New editions
come off the presses very frequently. And, in my experience, once you
suggest it to him, "You are an expert and while we agree with you, that
while Gray's Anatomy is generally authoritative, it's only the recent
edition that is authoritative. The others are of historical interest." Just
think of the treatises we lawyers use. You have a problem with
evidence, where do you go for the ultimate legal answer? Do you go to
the first or second edition? Of course not. They are outmoded. You make
it your business to be looking at the third edition with the various sup-
plements that have come out. The practice is the same in all professions.
What your expert is doing when he looks at the book is to be sure that
it is the current edition. So the book is "Jones on Recombinant DNA,
fifth edition," but the sixth edition came out last month and no doctor
will look at anything other than the current or up-to-date edition of
learned medical treatises.
If it is the current edition, no harm is done and we proceed. If it's not
the current edition, he simply gives the book back, says, "What's the
question?"
The lawyer says, "My question, Doctor, is whether that book, Jones
on Recombinant DNA, is authoritative?"
"No." That should be it, just, "No." The lawyer will be nonplussed.
And what he will do because he is nonplussed is say, "What do you
mean? How come? How dare you say that it is not authoritative."
And your expert, in the gentlest manner possible, should respond,
"Well, you see, Counsellor, no doctor, just as no lawyer, would look at
anything other than the most recent edition. If it is not the most recent
edition, it is not authoritative. And, Counsellor, that book you have in
your hand is outmoded. It is not the most recent edition."
And the lawyer says, "Oh." And puts the book away and your expert
has taught your opposing counsel something in the jury's presence.
That's a wonderful way to enhance your own expert's credibility.
Suppose nothing like this is available-the book is up-to-date and
there is something contradictory in the book. How do you handle that?
Well, your expert says it is authoritative and the other lawyer reads it
to the jury. You have got to prepare for this on redirect examination.
You cannot be winged or wonged. You can't extemporize it. You have
got to work it out in advance. If my experience is any guide, juries find
this explanation persuasive. Contradictory things go right to the juror.
So, now on redirect, "Doctor, on direct examination, you said that your
opinion was A, B, C?"
"That's right."
"And we hear on cross-examination that the treatise says X, Y, Z?"
"That's right."
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"Do you wish to change the testimony you gave on direct."
"No."
"Do you wish to correct your statement that the book is
authoritative?"
"Absolutely not."
So you set it up for the jury. Then the way I like to do it is, "Doctor, I
think you had better explain that to the jury." Then get out of the way
and sit down. And if you've prepared him, he will know how to explain
it, and the explanation should go something like this: "The book is
perfectly authoritative. But, you see, books have to be written about the
typical or the usual case. That book is a perfectly accurate description of
what you will usually find. But every once in a while, maybe one time
out of a million, you get the unusual, the unique case; and that is what
we have here. It is extraordinary and that is why it is beyond what the
author of the book wrote about."
If this explanation comes out the right way, listen to the jury box, and
you will hear an "Ahhh" from the jurors. It is involuntary on their part
and it is a manifestation of two things. First, the expert's explanation is
intuitively persuasive. It is consistent with the juror's sense of the way
the world works. You know, as they know, that nothing is absolutely
perfect, there is always the exception. Obviously, books cannot be writ-
ten about the exceptions; they have got to be written about what the
authors usually find. Second, in all seriousness, you know why the jurors
go, "Ahhh!" They're saying to you, "Thanks." You have given them
a profound, psychic pleasure, and they're grateful. And do you know
what that pleasure is? It's the pleasure of being able to go home and say
to the wife or husband, "I'm on jury duty, but not on an ordinary case.
This is one for the books. I mean, they'll be talking about this forever,
and I'm on the jury." They can feel this way, and they will make it up to
you.
D. Arguing the Expert's Credibility
At this point, let me briefly introduce the next subject. What I have
been doing for six and a half years is putting my feet up on my desk and
looking out the windows at the trees and the snowstorms, and
speculating, surmising what comes into your mind. And what it is you
speculate about is the stuff to which you have devoted your life. I'm a
trial lawyer, in all of its aspects: try them, judge them, teach them about
it.
One of the things that has intrigued me is that lawyers, both English
and American, for approximately three centuries, have been trying jury
cases in the way we are familiar with the trial of jury cases. If we
brought Lord Mansfield back to life he would be able to preside over a
case coming to trial next week. Bring Abraham Lincoln back to life, put
him in your courtroom, and absolutely nothing except the
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stenographer's machine would be unusual. He would recognize
everything else.
For three centuries we have been trying cases, and we know virtually
nothing about what actually persuades a juror because very few of us
are ever in the jury room. In some states, lawyers do occasionally serve
on juries, but that's so rare that it is hardly worth counting. None of us
ever listens in and there is no video-tape that we can play back. We
have a certain amount of data from mock trials but, of course, a mock
trial is a mock trial and the jury knows that it's a mock trial. You can't
be sure that you are getting an accurate view of how a real juror would
respond to this case if it were a real case. Beyond that we have anec-
dotes and war stories, the things we tell each other at cocktail parties.
Yes, that's useful, and it really raises the question, "Do you know what
goes on?" I don't purport to know what goes on, but I have been think-
ing about it. I want to put before you some thoughts that occurred to me
on the question of what persuades the jury to accept or reject the
credibility of an expert.
First, I take it for granted that a factor the jury can never use is what
you might call the substance of the opinion itself. The jurors cannot
become physicians or economists or engineers. No matter how carefully
you do it, no matter how long the judge gives you to do it, you cannot
teach jurors how to be doctors and economists and engineers within the
time given and the limitations that apply.
So, what do they rely upon? In my experience, the jury does a very
good job of assessing the credibility of an expert. I have a religious faith
in jurors, but how do they do it?
Recently, I came across the first published writing of Learned Hand.
He was a lawyer a year and a half out of Harvard Law School. He had
returned to Elizabethtown, New York, up in the Adirondacks, where his
father and uncle had practiced. He set up a practice with his cousin,
Augustus, and he was invited to speak to the Albany Bar Association,
that being forty miles down the road. He made a speech on expert
witnesses and the speech was printed in the journal of the Albany Bar
Association. It came to the attention of the Editors of the Harvard Law
Review and they thought it was so good that they reprinted it.38
What do you think it's about? It's about expert witnesses. What
aspect of expert witnesses? The one we've just touched upon. How in
Heaven's name can you justify what we did? We allowed the expert to
testify to begin with because the jury needs the expert's help. They
don't have that expertise. Each side calls an expert and they almost
always testify to diametrically opposed things. Then we say to the jury,
"Having permitted you to hear these experts because you know nothing
Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testi-
mony, 15 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1901).
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about it, you must now decide which one is worth believing." The pro-
cess is illogical and totally internally inconsistent. The only thing Hand
could suggest was a court-appointed expert to resolve the differences
between the two, and as we know, that just turns a two dimension prob-
lem into a three dimension one, which solves nothing.
Here is my speculation regarding what moves a jury as to expert wit-
ness credibility. If there is anything to this, its a rough guide on how to
argue it in summation.
First, jurors cannot become doctors, engineers or economists. But
jurors are eminently capabld of weighing qualifications, of weighing one
expert's qualifications against another's. Only if the differences are
gross or major will it count to the jury. Minor differences of the kind we
lawyers fuss around with mean nothing to them. But where on the one
hand you have the fellow who won the Nobel Prize in medicine and on
the other hand somebody's brother-in-law who got out of medical school
last week and has yet to take the examination, that's a gross difference.
It's worth arguing those vast differences because a juror will respond to
it and he'll remember it. Another reason to work very hard on your
qualifications; you want to use the affirmative force to work for you.
Second, also touched upon in connection with preparing to meet im-
peachment out of a treatise, jurors have a certain intuition or common
sense or lay view of how the world works. You have got to do your best
to make sure that your expert testifies in a manner that at least is not
inconsistent with their view of how the world works. If the other side's
expert has testified to something that you sense is just not something
the jury intuitively can accept, drive that home. So how do you know
how jurors view the world? Well, that is part of the trial lawyer's obli-
gation. You go to the movies for professional reasons, not for entertain-
ment, because that's what people are looking at. You read popular mag-
azines, popular novels and talk to the man on the street and do your
best to become an expert on the man on the street's view of things.
Third, do not neglect, though you've got to do it tactfully, the expert's
personality, his presence, his appearance-all of those things. You
understand what I mean by the word "personality" -the jury cannot be-
come a physician, et cetera, but they have with their own eyes seen the
experts. They have heard them, they have seen how they part their hair
and the kind of clothes that they wear. The jury will respond to that,
and you have got to lead them artfully to respond to that.
Just one brief anecdote drawn from my own experience in the early
days when I was prosecuting cases in the U.S. Attorney's office. About
the best case I tried, in the sense that had we been able to sell tickets I
would have retired then and there, was a case in which the defendant
was charged with the interstate transportation of stolen property, the
Dagot painting. The defendant allegedly stole the Dagot painting and
took it down to Texas where presumably he was going to sell it to the
international illegal art market. And you know what the defense was?
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Temporary insanity. And do you know what the basis of that claim was?
The defendant, in the order of a painting, had been in a long-standing
homosexual relationship which had then broken up. In the turmoil that
tended upon breaking up of that relationship, the defendant, in order to
strike back at his former lover, stole the painting which belonged to the
lover and which he knew had a certain symbolic importance to the other
fellow in their relationship. This is not wholly out of relevant possibility.
You understand, also, that the case turned on the expert testimony of
the psychiatrist. The defendant admits he did what he did, but he said
he was so upset that he was not responsible for it. We called the psychia-
trist who said he was sane, and they called a psychiatrist who said he
was insane. I am walking around the night before summation at home
trying to figure out what in Heaven's name to say to the jury. The
shrinks were of equal credentials, so you don't want to argue that. At
two in the morning it hit me that, quite by accident, the government
psychiatrist, and that was my side, looked like Van Johnson. He had
light red hair and a freckled complexion and an open expression on his
face. This was sheer good fortune. He had testified in plain English, no
jargon, no nonsense. He just looked like the boy next door who happened
to go on to medical school, and because he couldn't stand blood, he
became a psychiatrist.
The other side's shrink, of at least equal credentials, did not look that
way. I am not going to tell you how he looked, but it hit me that there
was an argument I should make. Now remember, I was twenty-six years
old, and I was foolhardy enough to do things I'm not sure I would do
now. It was 1960. I ask you to remember that that was a presidential
election year. I ask you to remember who ran against whom. I represent
to you that I made the following argument in almost exactly these
words to the jury. "Ladies and Gentlemen, the prosecution has called
Dr. Smith and the defense has called Dr. Jones. And they have told you
about their credentials, and their credentials are about equal and there
is nothing for me to say about that. They have given you their opinion.
Dr. Smith says he's sane, and Dr. Jones says he is not sane. And we're
not psychiatrists, we're in no position to assess the merits of the opi-
nion. But you know, each doctor was on the stand for at least half a day.
You saw what they looked like, you heard their voices, you heard how
they spoke. Now, let me ask you, which one would you buy a used car
from?" End of argument.
I went on to something else. There was no commotion from defense
counsel; the judge sat there quietly and the jurors are still with me.
Defense counsel's expert looked exactly like Richard Nixon. It's not his
fault but, you know-the beard, the funny nose and the hair. I don't
want to get into any political arguments. Actually, I was introducing the
way they were introduced. It struck me that this expert had the kind of
appearance which suggested that he ought to be indicted on something. So
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that's what I was playing upon. So remember that you might have a
case in which you can play upon appearances.
Finally, the single most important factor affecting the jury's assess-
ment of the credibility of your witness, expert or otherwise, is your
credibility. Lawyers have an enormous effect upon juries, and if the
jury has decided that you are a straight-shooter, they will assume
that you have called honest witnesses.
So we end with perhaps where we should have begun: Rather than ex-
perts, project at all times and in all circumstances to the jury that you
are an honest man or woman who happens, by ill-fortune, to be a lawyer.
Get that across and you will win your case.
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